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**The Space between Us:
Elite Action, Public Opinion, and the Euro Crisis**

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Paper produced for the annual conference of the
International Studies Association
San Francisco, CA
April 3, 2013

Abstract:

The top-down style and economic costs of macroeconomic coordination among European Union (EU) member states since the onset of the euro crisis in 2010 have stoked simmering public discontent—and intensified longstanding questions regarding the popular legitimacy of the EU and its purported “democratic deficit.” Whereas most studies of the EU’s democratic deficit emphasize accountability of EU-level institutions, this paper examines the gaps between decisions by *national* political elites—specifically, legislative votes on the European Stability Mechanism and Fiscal Compact—and public attitudes—drawn from the most recent Eurobarometer surveys—regarding EU initiatives to resolve the crisis. Our measures of elite-mass gaps tend to confirm expectations of elites’ greater level of support for the EU, and our empirical analysis offers initial evidence that convergence between elite and mass attitudes is most closely associated with higher levels of national debt, trust in political parties, and income inequality. These preliminary observations imply that the democratic deficit is less significant in crisis-stricken countries such as Greece than creditor countries such as Germany, and thus that elites in the latter have yet to convince their citizens of the necessity of costly, EU-level collective action.

The European debt crisis, now in its fourth year, has induced European Union (EU) members to pursue a set of macroeconomic policy initiatives—notably, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact¹—to more tightly bind members of the euro area via formal fiscal and financial integration. Whereas European integration has historically been a voluntary affair, closer EU fiscal coordination since 2010 has been an exercise in crisis management, one whose top-down style and costly provisions have stoked simmering public discontent. Opinion polls and mass demonstrations in debtor and creditor countries alike suggest increasing public anger at a process in which creditor states and institutions (especially the ‘troika’ of the EU, European Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF)) commit taxpayer funds to rescue governments facing payments and/or banking crises and demand tough austerity measures in return. As such, the EU’s debt crisis and policy response has intensified longstanding questions regarding the popular legitimacy of the EU and the status of its democratic deficit.

This paper addresses the EU’s democratic deficit as a function of the extent to which *national elites’* choices regarding crisis-driven integration reflect the popular will. This approach builds on an earlier literature that described a “passive consensus” among citizens regarding European integration (see Lindberg & Scheingold 1970; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993), and seeks to identify conditions that could turn passive consensus into active dissensus. We focus on the gaps between decisions by national political elites—specifically, legislative votes on the ESM and Fiscal Compact—and public attitudes—drawn from the most recent Eurobarometer surveys—regarding both the general principle of EU collective action and specific initiatives to resolve the crisis.

Our measures of elite-mass gaps tend to confirm expectations of elites’ greater level of support for the EU, and offer some support for Hooghe’s (2005) claim that European elites are more likely than ordinary citizens to support initiatives like the ESM and Fiscal Compact whose purpose is to manage interdependence and limit negative policy externalities. Our initial empirical analysis offers the somewhat unexpected findings that convergence between elite and mass attitudes is most closely associated with higher levels of national debt, trust in political parties, and income inequality. These preliminary observations imply that the democratic deficit is less significant in crisis-stricken countries such as Greece than creditor countries such as Germany, and thus that elites in the latter have yet to convince their citizens of the necessity of costly, EU-level collective action.

The paper begins with a brief consideration of the unique conditions of “crisis-driven integration” and the nature of the democratic deficit. The subsequent section addresses the literatures on elite and mass attitudes toward European integration, ultimately identifying several hypotheses regarding the determinants of gaps between elite and mass attitudes. The remainder of the paper offers an initial look at 2012 data regarding elite-mass gaps and a preliminary evaluation of hypotheses, and a set of initial conclusions and future directions for research.

¹ The ESM is a permanent fund to finance rescues of euro area governments facing payments crises—in essence, an IMF for the eurozone. In 2012, the ESM replaced the temporary European Financial Stability Facility, created in 2010. The 2012 Fiscal Compact—formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union—binds all members of the EU (except the UK, which did not sign) to specific, enforceable targets for budget deficits and debts. The Compact replaced the weak Stability and Growth Pact, agreed in 1997 before the introduction of the euro.

Crisis-driven integration and the democratic deficit

European integration has long followed a discontinuous path, with European leaders agreeing to enhance the Community's/Union's constitutional status and policy competences more during "good times" (1950-73, 1985-91, 2003-8) than periods of economic stagnation (Eichengreen & Dalton 1993; Dinan 2010). This positive correlation between integration and economic expansion has, in the context of the post-2010 euro debt crisis, been reversed: major macroeconomic integration initiatives like the ESM and Fiscal Compact have come during a period of austerity and painful economic contraction across Europe.

In this crisis context, much attention regarding the EU's democratic deficit has been focused on the manner in which EU institutions (the Council and Eurogroup, in which Germany has had predominant sway, as well as the ECB) have imposed austerity policies and other painful reforms on crisis-hit countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and now Cyprus. These concerns tap into an existing debate in the EU literature regarding the size and importance of the democratic deficit in the European Union, with some indicating that the deficit is a large and growing concern (Siedentop 2000; Majone 1998) and others proving more sanguine (Moravcsik 2004, 2012). This debate has tended to focus on formal mechanisms of accountability, representativeness, and responsiveness in EU-level institutions, leading to prescriptions for enhancing the power of the directly elected European Parliament or establishing direct elections for the president of the European Commission.

Yet such a focus misses two key aspects of the current crisis context. First, EU-level agreements now involve not the distribution of potential future gains but the distribution of actual immediate-term costs, borne mostly by the public. As such, the legitimacy of crisis-driven integration is largely a function of sentiments of European solidarity at all levels of member states' societies, from 'Europeanized' elites to German taxpayers to Greek pensioners.² Second, the European Council and Eurogroup are forums controlled by national governments, not 'Eurocrats.' As such, questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of EU initiatives like the ESM and Fiscal Compact—as with any initiatives emerging primarily from these forums—should focus less on EU citizens' relationships to EU-level institutions and more on their relationships to their own national governments.

This paper, therefore, examines the EU's democratic deficit through the lens of elite and mass attitudes at the national level. This conceptualization of the democratic deficit is not in itself new—among others, Schlesinger (1999) explicitly considered elite-mass gaps as a function of an asymmetrical "public sphere," while Risse (2003) addressed the possibility that the euro currency would increase citizens' identification with the EU to the level of political and economic elites. The main contribution of this paper is to begin to develop clear empirical measures of the democratic deficit as a function of elite-mass gaps within EU member states and initial tests of possible explanations for cross-national variation therein.

² On solidarity in the European Union, see among others Habermas (2009) and Weber (2007).

Literature review and hypotheses

Despite their many differences, the two main schools of European integration theory, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, agree on one thing: political and economic elites drive the dynamics of European integration. Public attitudes have rarely been identified as a driver of European integration, with a permissive consensus seen as sufficient condition for elites to move forward (see Lindberg & Scheingold 1970; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993).³ Yet the EU literature has long recognized a gap between elite and mass attitudes regarding European integration in general. Deutsch (1957, 1968) acknowledged that ‘we feeling’ was a sentiment largely confined to elites, and articulated a cascade model to describe the conditions under which such sentiments might trickle down to the masses. Indeed, although socialization of European elites toward a predominantly European identity or values has been limited (Checkel 2005, *passim*), it has long been recognized that the EU has greater ‘entativity’ (Risse 2003) for political and other elites than for the general publics of EU member states. Therefore, although one cannot simply assume political and economic elites always sustain a pro-EU consensus, we start from the expectation that the size of the elite-mass gap is primarily a function of the extent to which mass attitudes toward EU integration converge ‘upwards’ toward those of political elites in particular.

Scholars of European citizens’ attitudes have identified a number of factors at both the individual and aggregate levels that may determine the public’s level of support for EU integration in general (i.e., in ‘normal’ times). At the individual level, scholars have connected support for EU integration with the prospect of economic gains (Inglehart & Rabier 1978; Eichenberg & Dalton 1993), levels of social trust toward political institutions and/or other European citizens (Delhey 2007, Genna 2009), and strength of national v. European identity (Risse 2003, Hooghe & Marks 2004, Citrin & Sides 2004, Flockhart 2010), among others. At a more aggregate level, scholars have identified national-level factors relevant to public support for both EU integration in general and macroeconomic integration in particular, including the extensiveness of the attentive public and/or well-informed “public sphere” (Deutsch 1968; Sinnott 1995; Wessels 1995; Schlesinger 1999; Constantelos & Diven 2011), and length of tenure in the European Union (Bosch & Newton 1995).

Our goal is to develop hypotheses that can not only explain the relative convergence between elite and mass attitudes but also offer insights more specifically into macroeconomic integration within a crisis context. Essential here is the work of Hooghe (2005), who showed that elites and masses tend to emphasize different goals and purposes of economic integration: while elites focus on managing European interdependence and externalities thereof, publics tend to emphasize EU action to maintain a generally high standard of living and strengthen social safety nets. Because the ESM and Fiscal Compact—as well as proposals for Eurobonds and EU-level banking supervision, etc.—are primarily of the type associated with elite motivations to “internalize externalities beyond the nation-state,” the relevant questions become: Can European publics be persuaded of the necessity and perhaps utility of further macroeconomic integration?

³ Inglehart approached the role of public opinion differently from most in that he examined the extent to which changing public attitudes would “push” elites toward pursuing greater EU integration as opposed to the “pull” model (i.e., elites pulling masses toward acceptance of integration). See among others Inglehart (1971, 1977) and Inglehart, Rabier, & Reif (1987). In this early draft, we focus on conditions associated with elite-mass convergence but not mechanisms through which such convergence might occur.

Which member-states' citizens are going to be more difficult to persuade? Would such persuasion focus on convincing citizens of the interdependence rationale, or on emphasizing implications for the welfare state?

Our immediate goal, however, is to articulate a set of hypotheses to explain the cross-national variation in the elite-mass gaps we observe. Most of the hypotheses derive from a subset of the public opinion literature addressed above.

Trust

- *H1a*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in countries with higher levels of trust in their national government, because citizens in these countries will prefer national-level to EU-level policies to manage fiscal/financial crises.⁴
- *H1b*: The elite-mass gap will be smaller in countries with higher levels of trust in their national government, because citizens will be less likely to question the EU-related decisions of their national political leaders.

Identity

- *H2*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in countries where levels of self-identification as 'European' are lower, because lower identification with the EU is associated with less support for European integration generally.

Attentive public

- *H3*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in countries where the attentive public is smaller, because inattentive publics are less likely than attentive publics to perceive the necessity of EU-mandated macroeconomic measures adopted by political elites.

Given the importance of the crisis context, we consider two additional hypotheses reflecting aggregate level variables relevant in this context. The first involves the size of a country's public debt. In some sense, this hypothesis is an adjunct of the abovementioned "prospect of economic gains" approach: it considers whether elites and publics in countries with higher public debts (and thus facing a payments crisis, in the present or future) are likelier to converge on support for EU-level initiatives than countries with lower levels of public debt. The second involves social inequality. The conjecture here is that attitudinal gaps between elites and masses regarding EU integration mirror income gaps—and thus more inequality correlates with more elite-mass divergence regarding EU initiatives.

Debt status

- *H4a*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in creditor countries, because the public is less likely to perceive the necessity of committing taxpayer funds to bail out other, less 'responsible' governments.⁵

⁴ The premise here is that citizens *and* elites inherently prefer national-level policy solutions, but accept EU-level policy solutions if national-level governments are perceived to be ineffective in addressing policy problems.

⁵ This hypothesis is consistent with the work of Constantelos & Diven (2011) and McLaren (2006), who explain public confidence in EU partly as a function of whether country is a net recipient v. net donor. (Net recipients have more confidence.)

- *H4b*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in debtor countries, because the public is more likely to experience the pain of austerity measures imposed by the EU (and accepted by their political leaders).

Income inequality

- *H5*: The elite-mass gap will be larger in countries with higher levels of income inequality, because gaps regarding EU fiscal/financial policy will mirror more general divides between elites and masses on policy issues.

Data and initial conclusions

For reasons noted above, we conceptualize the EU's democratic deficit as a function of the gap between elite and public attitudes with respect to two macroeconomic policy initiatives, the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact. As such, we measure the EU-related democratic deficit within individual countries as a function of the size of the elite-mass gap, and the deficit in the EU as a whole as a function of the sum of the gaps of all countries. As demonstrated in the figures below (see appendix), if elite and mass opinions were perfectly aligned within any given country then the data point would fall on the 45 degree line emanating from the origin (with mass opinion on the x-axis and elite opinion on the y-axis). Thus the gap for any individual country is measured as a function of the distance from this 45 degree line, and the total democratic deficit as a function of the sum of the individual gaps.

Although some have used qualitative methods to capture elite attitudes regarding the European Union (see Checkel 2005, *passim*), quantifying attitudes can be tricky. To capture the attitudes of national political elites toward the EU, we chose the ratification votes in member states' national legislatures on the two main macroeconomic initiatives of 2012, the ESM and the Fiscal Compact. Specifically, we computed the percentage of votes in the lower house of the national legislature to vote in favor of ratification. The virtue of these ratification votes is that they give us an indicator of the attitudes of political elites on pieces of legislation (in reality, treaties) that are identical across EU member countries. As shown below, the votes on both treaties in nearly all cases involved large majorities in favor, indicating not only high levels of elite support but also a consistency across distinct pieces of legislation that reinforces their validity as measures of elite opinion.

Our measures of mass opinion draw on the most recent Eurobarometer (EB) survey, conducted in late 2012. We chose five survey questions, listed below, to use as indicators of European citizens' views regarding macroeconomic integration, ranging from general, "should European member states work together to resolve the crisis" questions to those soliciting views on specific initiatives, such as Eurobonds. The underlying rationale for these selections draws on Sinnott (1995), who differentiated popular support for EU initiatives across distinct policy areas by distinguishing between areas that are "fertile ground" (on which the public believes the EU should have primary competence but as yet does not) and those that are "proceed and persuade" (on which elites have given the EU some competence without publics perceiving the area as "international"). The goal was ultimately to have sufficient range in the specificity of the EU initiatives addressed in the EB questions that macroeconomic policy more generally could be understood as either "fertile ground" or "proceed and persuade."

Eurobarometer questions (EB77, autumn 2012)

- QC4a.11: As a consequence of the crisis, EU countries will have to work more closely together (total % answering 'agree')
- QC3a: In your opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis (% answering 'The European Union')
- QC6.3: Likely to be effective or not: A stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among the countries of the euro area (total % answering 'effective')
- QA19.1: For it or against it: A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro
- QC7.4: In favor or opposed to measures to be taken by the EU: the introduction of Eurobonds

Legislative votes on the Fiscal Compact and Stability Mechanism reveal high levels of support for macroeconomic integration across Europe. Indeed, as Table 1 shows an average of 83% of legislators voted to ratify the Fiscal Compact and 86% of legislators voted to ratify the Stability Mechanism. The lone exception to this broad pattern of elite consensus was the French legislature's weak support for the Stability Mechanism. As a result of the Socialist Party's decision to boycott the vote in the National Assembly, the Stability Mechanism was approved by only a narrow majority.⁶

As Table 2 shows, mass opinion on EU integration in 2012 was considerably more divided. On the general measures of opinion towards the EU, the public was quite positive. More than 75% of Europeans expressed the belief that stronger coordination among euro area countries would be an effective solution to future economic problems and more than 85% said that EU countries would have to work more closely together as a result of the crisis. On specific policy questions, however, the public was more skeptical of EU action. The introduction of Eurobonds and the European monetary union with a single currency were less popular with most Europeans.

Figures 1 and 2 visually depict the relationship between the legislative votes and the mass opinion statistics presented in Tables 1 and 2. As indicated by the large clustering of countries above the 45 degree line in the scatterplots, elites in almost every country were considerably more supportive of European integration than their respective publics. More importantly for our purposes here, countries that scored very high on one measure of the elite-mass divide tended to score very highly on other measures of the elite-mass divide – with the average correlation coefficient between measures surpassing $r = .7$.

What might explain cross-national variations in the size of the elite-mass gap on European integration? In order to answer this question, we fit ten separate OLS regression models – one for each of our separate measures of the elite-mass divide. Each model included national-level measures of: (1) the public's trust in political parties; (2) the public's attachment to the European Union; (3) the public's attention to and engagement with politics; (4) the size of the government's debt as a percentage of GDP; (5) the extent of income inequality as measured by

⁶ 85% of legislators actually casting a vote approved of the Stability Mechanism.

the Gini coefficient; and (6) whether the country is a member of the Eurozone. Tables 3 and 4 present the results of our analyses.

The results shown in Tables 3 and 4 suggest a number of conclusions about the factors that drive elite-mass divisions on European integration. First, consistent with H1b, we find that higher levels of trust in national political parties lead to smaller gaps between elite votes and mass opinions. Indeed, trust is a significant predictor in four of the five models predicting elite-mass gaps using a measure based on Stability Mechanism votes and it returned a negative coefficient in all ten of our regressions. Second, the size of the elite-mass divide is larger in creditor countries than in debtor countries. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, government debt as a percentage of GDP is significantly and negatively associated with the size of elite-mass divides in six of our ten regression models. Third, higher levels of economic inequality seem to lead to smaller gaps between elites and the mass public on European integration. Standing in stark contrast to the expectation spelled out in H5, we found that a country's Gini coefficient was a significant and negative predictor of elite-mass divides. Finally, there is no evidence that attachment to the EU, the size of the attentive public or membership in the Eurozone has any impact at all on the size of the elite-mass divide.

These findings are preliminary and based on a small number of cases, and thus we hesitate to draw strong conclusions from them. However, one initial conclusion is certainly worth exploring: the relatively larger elite-mass gaps in creditor as opposed to debtor countries. While Greece's overall mean elite-mass gap was the smallest among countries surveyed, Germany's was the third largest. It would seem that domestic publics in Germany and other creditor countries are far less in line with their leaders' acceptance of the need to take on others' liabilities than citizens of Greece and other debtors are in line with their leaders' acceptance of the need to undertake austerity at the behest of others. This suggests two things. First, leaders in creditor countries have relatively farther to go to convince their citizens of the need to sacrifice for the sake of the survival of the euro and the European collective good more generally. Second, even if austerity measures may be a controversial policy choice, they are *politically* expedient—because they are likely to minimize the overall elite-mass gap, given that citizens in creditor countries demand them and those of debtor countries (grudgingly) accept them.

Future iterations of this paper will emphasize three refinements. First, at a theoretical level, we will explore the question of whether persistent elite-mass gaps overall reflect the persistence of differing motivations for supporting EU integration identified by Hooghe (2005). Does cross-national variation in these gaps imply differing degrees of appreciation of the interdependence rationale (“we’re stuck together, so we have to stick together”) or differing views of the distributional implications of macroeconomic coordination (Eurobonds imply weakening the German safety net to shore up the Greek one)—or something else?⁷ Second, in our data analysis we will focus on more targeted measures of the elite-mass gap, and consider additional indicators of elite and mass opinion that might permit us to multiply the number of cases and engage in over-time analysis. Third, we will broaden and deepen the analysis by examining both the top-down and bottom-up mechanisms through which convergence between elite and mass attitudes

⁷ Certain policy initiatives such Eurobonds and greater EU-level fiscal authority might imply increasing fiscal transfers from wealthier to less-wealthy euro area countries and thus such initiatives would be consistent with purported mass-level preferences in countries likely to benefit from such transfers.

might occur. Several authors have examined the question of how elite attitudes filter down to the public both in the EU literature (see Deutsch 1968; Wessels 1995) and the American behavioral literature (e.g., Baum & Potter 2008). It is also important to consider the question of bottom-up constraints on national elites, especially during a period in which growing nationalism appears connected to anti-EU sentiments.⁸ Even among countries in which nationalism is not a primary consideration—most notably, Germany—the means and willingness of the public to hold their leaders accountable for costly commitments to the EU is of primary concern.

⁸ Particularly interesting is the mixed record of national elections since 2010. There is notable cross-national variation in public approbation of governments following the creation of EU-level institutions in the EFSF/ESM, Fiscal Compact, and the like that mandate either austerity or taxpayer-funded bailouts: among creditor countries the public backlash against the EU was greater in Finland than the Netherlands, while among debtor countries the public backlash was somewhat greater in Ireland and Portugal than Greece (second election).

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Table 1 – Legislative Votes on EU Integration

	Fiscal Compact	European Stability Mechanism
Austria	63.19	
Belgium		90.00
Bulgaria		84.00
Cyprus		
Czech Republic		79.03
Denmark	74.77	75.93
Estonia	100.00	97.73
Finland	78.09	78.43
France	88.47	50.45
Germany	94.20	94.20
Greece	76.68	76.68
Hungary		88.89
Ireland	81.58	
Italy	82.76	86.47
Latvia	69.07	100.00
Lithuania	71.43	91.01
Luxembourg	82.14	90.57
Malta		
Netherlands		68.49
Poland	68.67	64.71
Portugal	88.70	
Romania	98.89	99.68
Slovakia	98.57	91.55
Slovenia	97.37	96.39
Spain	97.96	99.57
Sweden	80.71	93.95
Average	83.86	85.61

Entries are percentages.

Table 2 – Mass Support for EU Integration

	Strong Coordination of Policies Likely to be Effective	EU Members Must Work Together	EU as Most Effective Authority in Crisis	Effectiveness of Eurobonds	Support for Euro
Austria	70	75	50	56	68
Belgium	85	89	57	69	76
Bulgaria	79	84	55	66	61
Cyprus	91	97	54	50	54
Czech Republic	70	80	52	60	74
Denmark	74	90	51	56	71
Estonia	64	83	55	43	73
Finland	73	84	54	51	75
France	82	87	49	63	71
Germany	82	91	53	35	68
Greece	80	87	50	67	77
Hungary	59	85	50	55	53
Ireland	70	76	53	69	83
Italy	71	78	55	65	61
Latvia	69	78	51	41	43
Lithuania	64	83	55	49	48
Luxembourg	83	93	62	64	80
Malta	78	81	50	62	66
Netherlands	83	88	52	52	74
Poland	70	82	60	65	40
Portugal	71	76	50	68	63
Romania	71	76	36	66	69
Slovakia	87	90	60	64	82
Slovenia	78	90	56	56	81
Spain	81	87	53	61	60
Sweden	72	89	46	49	28
Average	75	85	52	58	65

Entries are percentages.

Table 3 – OLS Regression Results for Fiscal Compact Measures

Gap between Stability Mechanism Vote and...	Strong Coordination of Policies Likely to be Effective		EU Members Must Work Together		EU as Most Effective Authority in Crisis		Effectiveness of Eurobonds		Support for Euro	
Government Debt	-.17	.09 +	-.08	.09	-.08	.13	-.26	.12 *	-.04	.13
Attentive Public	-.24	.41	-.56	.42	-.21	.63	.00	.57	-.65	.61
Trust	-.39	.32	-.39	.33	-.39	.49	-.73	.44	-.61	.47
EU Attachment	-.29	.25	-.13	.26	-.09	.39	-.18	.35	-.05	.38
Gini Coefficient	.20	.99	.03	1.03	-.54	1.54	-1.47	1.38	-1.16	1.49
Eurozone	8.15	6.12	9.33	6.35	7.21	9.49	12.12	8.49	-14.47	9.17
Constant	34.48	39.82	21.15	41.37	64.26	61.79	103.73	55.29 +	92.53	59.73
N	18		18		18		18		18	

Table 4 – OLS Regression Results for Stability Mechanism Measures

Gap between Stability Mechanism Vote and...	Strong Coordination of Policies Likely to be Effective		EU Members Must Work Together		EU as Most Effective Authority in Crisis		Effectiveness of Eurobonds		Support for Euro	
Government Debt	-.29	.11 *	-.23	.11 *	-.21	.12 +	-.38	.14 *	-.17	.17
Attentive Public	.47	.50	.23	.51	.48	.58	.69	.66	.31	.78
Trust	-1.16	.34 **	-.92	.34 *	-.81	.39 *	-1.03	.44 *	-.81	.52
EU Attachment	-.07	.31	.01	.31	-.01	.36	-.15	.41	.11	.49
Gini Coefficient	-2.08	.76 *	-1.21	.77	-1.55	.87 +	-2.22	.99 *	-1.53	1.19
Eurozone	-3.09	6.35	1.35	6.43	-.11	7.31	6.52	8.32	-16.54	9.93
Constant	112.66	29.16 **	64.86	29.53 *	102.11	33.59 *	131.83	38.22 **	93.32	45.62 +
N	20		20		20		20		20	

Figure 1 – Elite-Mass Gap (Fiscal Compact Vote and Eurobarometer Questions)




Figure 2 – Elite-Mass Gap (ESM Vote and Eurobarometer Questions)

