Ben Lennertz

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Department/Office Information

Philosophy

109 Hascall Hall

blennertz@colgate.edu (315) 228-6446

Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Southern California, August 2014
B.A. Philosophy and Mathematics, Vassar College, May 2007

Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (especially their intersection)

Logic, Early Modern Philosophy, Metaethics, Philosophy of Religion

“Uncertainty and Intention.” (forthcoming). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
“Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality.” (forthcoming). Erkenntnis.
“Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.” (2022), Ergo, 9(8).
“Quantificational Attitudes.” (2021), The Journal of Philosophy, 118(11), 585-613.
“Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.” (2021), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(1), 62-79.
“Noncognitivism and the Frege-Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.” (2021), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(1), 184-208.
“Linguistic Disobedience.” (2020), Philosophers' Imprint, 20(21), 1-16. (with David Miguel Gray)
“What Might But Must Not Be.” (2020), Analysis, 80(4), 647-656. (with Stephen Finlay)
“Evaluating the Multiple Proposition Strategy” (2020), Ratio, 33(3), 163-172.
“Might-beliefs and Asymmetric Disagreement.” (2019), Synthese, 196(11), 4775-4805.
“Probabilistic Consistency Norms and Quantificational Credences.” (2017), Synthese, 194(6), 2101-2119.
“A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.” (2017), Ergo, 4(2), 27-59.
“Quantificational Credences.” (2015), Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(9), 1-24.
“Simple Contextualism about Epistemic Modals is Incorrect.” (2014), Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 3(4), 252-262.
“Taking ‘Might’-Communication Seriously.” (2014), Analytic Philosophy, 55(2), 176-198.