INTERVENERS AND PERPETRATORS: ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE DURING THE
1992-1995 BOSNIAN WAR

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Introduction

The catastrophic genocide and ethnic cleansing that pervaded World War II opened the international community’s doors to humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”\(^1\) It greatly conflicts with the historical international relations principle of sovereignty, which suggests that states have the right to govern their own affairs without interference from other states. However, with the brutal massacre of millions of men, women, and children during World War II, the international community realized a need for states to monitor one another. The 1945 UN Charter, developed in the aftermath of World War II, upholds the principle of sovereignty and thus makes the possibility of humanitarian intervention difficult. However, according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council can take military action to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”\(^2\) Still, since sovereignty is so deeply engrained in normative state behavior, the use of Chapter VII has been controversial.

As mass violence against civilians carried on throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century and especially during the 1990s, the international community came to slowly view

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humanitarian intervention as more legitimate. At the 2005 UN World Summit, world leaders adopted a new principle entitled the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to the UN General Assembly Resolution:

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity… The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

As humanitarian intervention enters a new phase of worldwide acceptance with the adoption of R2P, world leaders must ask: does humanitarian intervention work?

This question is the subject of my research study. I analyze the effect humanitarian intervention has on one-sided violence by using a specific case study of the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. One-sided violence refers to violence that is carried out by one group (the perpetrator) against another group (the victim) during war. It differs from genocide in that it includes other incidents in addition to genocidal acts, such as terrorist attacks, individual and mass executions, and others. The types of intervention that my research focuses on are airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, and threats. I divide one-sided violence simply into the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed. Using a time series statistical analysis, I determine if airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, and threats lead to an increase or decrease, or have no effect, on the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed. Doing so determines

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whether or not humanitarian intervention worked in the case of the 1992-1995 Bosnian War.

**Background of the 1992-1995 Bosnian War**

The 1992-1995 Bosnian War was one of several post-Cold War conflicts that the international community intervened in to relieve massive amounts of human suffering. World powers engaged in humanitarian intervention during other conflicts of this period as well, such as in Iraq (1991-1993), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Kosovo (1999). These conflicts all involved hostilities and the use of one-sided violence amongst fighting sub-national groups: Kurds and Shiites in Iraq, competing sub-Hawiye clan groups in Somalia, the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, and the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The Bosnian War specifically featured fighting amongst the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. These sub-national groups all resorted to violence as a result of tensions over national autonomy. The Kurds in Iraq desired an independent state, as did the sub-Hawiye clan groups in Somalia, the Hutus in Rwanda, the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, as well as the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia. In essence, the 1992-1995 Bosnian War and the civilian suffering that plagued it were similar to other conflicts at the time.

**On the Ground**

The 1992-1995 Bosnian War witnessed the worst case of genocide in Europe since World War II. The war featured hostilities amongst the three dominant ethnic groups living in Bosnia at the time: the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. Prior to the

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6 Wheeler, *Saving Strangers.*
7 Alex Lockie and Armin Rosen, “It’s been 20 years since Europe’s worst atrocity since World War II,” *Business Insider* 12 Jul. 2015.
war, these groups resided comfortably with one another as part of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following President Tito’s vision of a brotherly, socialist community in Yugoslavia. According to the 1991 census, there were 1,902,956 Bosnian Muslims, 1,366,104 Bosnian Serbs, and 760,852 Bosnian Croats living in Bosnia prior to the war.⁸

President Tito’s death in 1980 and the eventual termination of the Cold War brought about socio-political changes in Bosnia. Efforts at democratization coincided with economic and constitutional disarray. This harmful combination contributed to the rise of ethno-nationalism in Bosnia, as the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats came to identify more with their individual ethnic group instead of a unified community. As a result, ethno-nationalist parties representing the separate groups dominated the Bosnian elections in 1990 and ousted the ruling Communists. Although they insisted beforehand that they would work in tandem, these parties competed with one another for influence over the government. These ethnic tensions transferred over to the general public as well, as ethnic-based processes of inclusion and exclusion dominated the public and private sectors and polarization dominated the media.⁹

The strains amongst the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats intensified with the involvement of external influence. The Bosnian Serbs and Croats in particular gained assistance from neighboring governments. Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia aided the former, whereas Franjo Tudjman in Croatia aided the latter.¹⁰

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⁹ Ibid.
benefited from the most advanced leadership, including strong, nationalist leaders like Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and Alija Izebegovic, president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Karadzic also held the powerful position of president of the Bosnian Serb republic, Republika Srpska. The War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague later indicted him as a war criminal. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims both lacked strong leadership.\(^\text{11}\)

Tensions amongst the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats intensified further as a result of the outbreak of war between Serbia and Croatia in 1991. War soon after broke out in Bosnia, following a Serb military assault in the Drina Valley against those who feared a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia fought for independence. By May 1992, ethnic cleansing campaigns were underway with the purpose of creating distinct, ethnically homogenous territories. In short, “violent ethnic cleansing is a military tactic to realize a larger strategic vision. And… it is a tactic that is as much about seizing and consolidating territory as it is about identity.”\(^\text{12}\) This strategic definition of ethnic cleansing describes why such campaigns are often associated with warfare.

Ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian War involved murder, torture, sexual assault, abuse, expulsions, and destruction of religious buildings. The Bosnian Serbs dominated the ethnic cleansing scene and caused most destruction to the Bosnian Muslim community, though each ethnic group perpetrated violence against the others. The overarching Bosnian Serbian goal in the ethnic cleansing campaign was to secure territory they had acquired early on in the war. By July and August 1992, it became

\(^{11}\) Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*.

\(^{12}\) Toal and Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal*. 
apparent that Bosnian Serbs operated detention camps for Bosnian Muslims, who were forced to live in horrific conditions. At these camps, the Bosnian Serbs tortured and even executed Bosnian Muslims. Violence during the war also included acts of genocide, most notably at Srebrenica in July 1995.\textsuperscript{13}

*International Involvement*

International involvement began early on during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The European Commission decided that the inter-republican borders should become the legally recognized borders of the new states emerging from the former Yugoslavia; however, this concept suggested that members of a certain ethno-national republic living outside the borders would become minorities in their state and could not join the other members of their group. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs became committed to radical ethno-nationalism through violent means, which contributed to the war in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{14}

Initially, the international community, and Europe especially, did not have aggressive involvement in the war, as it was focused on the emerging new states in eastern Europe with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany.\textsuperscript{15} However, increased media attention toward the atrocities of the Bosnian War led to further international involvement. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 770 in August 1992, which authorized member states to “use all necessary means” to deliver humanitarian aid to the civilians of Bosnia. During their subsequent involvement in Bosnia, UN peacekeepers did little to halt Bosnian Serb aggression against civilians,

\textsuperscript{13} Burg and Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*.
\textsuperscript{14} Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*.
particularly against Bosnian Muslims. Britain and France fiercely opposed heavy military engagement with airstrikes, though U.S. presidential candidate Clinton advocated on behalf of NATO air power to end atrocities.\textsuperscript{16}

In order to appease this American pressure, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 819 in April 1993, which designated Srebrenica as a safe area. Resolution 824 one month later further declared Bihac, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Zepa, and Gorazde as safe areas. The resolutions did not permit the peacekeepers operating in these areas to use force and defend the civilians living there in case of an attack.\textsuperscript{17} As peacekeepers became increasingly at risk and violence against civilians carried on, the UN decided to turn to NATO airstrikes to alleviate the problem. These airstrikes began in April 1994 with an attack against Bosnian Serb forces in Gorazde. NATO continued to attack Bosnian Serb forces that posed a direct threat to the safe areas, as well as ammunition dumps, command and control, armament factories, and fuel supplies. The airstrike campaign came to conclusion in September 1995.\textsuperscript{18}

Under US facilitation, the war finally culminated in the Dayton Accords in November.\textsuperscript{19,20} The Dayton constitution redefined “the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” as a state of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation) and the \textit{Republika Srpska} (the Bosnian Serb Republic). It also established Bosnia-Herzegovina as a decentralized state, in which the government possessed very limited powers. Most telling of the difficulties in power

\textsuperscript{16} Wheeler, \textit{Saving Strangers}.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Richard Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War} (Modern Library: 1999).
sharing within the Bosnian government is perhaps seen in the presidency: it is composed of three members, one from each major ethno-national group, who must act in unison.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition to assisting the combating parties in arriving at a resolution with the Dayton Accords, the international community finally expressed its complete dismay for the atrocities committed during the war with UN Security Council Resolution 1034, adopted in December 1995. It condemned “all violations of international humanitarian law and human rights,” particularly “violations of international humanitarian law and human rights by Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most.”\textsuperscript{22}

**Theoretical Approaches to Understanding One-Sided Violence and Intervention**

*One-Sided Violence Theories*

One-sided violence refers to violence that is carried out by one group (the perpetrator) against another (the victim) during war. It differs from genocide in that it includes other incidents in addition to genocidal acts, such as terrorist attacks, individual and mass executions, and others.\textsuperscript{23} As a result of the international community’s increased attention toward ethnic cleansing and war crimes, many scholars have attempted to study this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{24} They tend to study a variety of aspects of violence: why it begins\textsuperscript{25} and why its intensity fluctuates\textsuperscript{26}, amongst others.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Walling, All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Eck and Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data.”
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Gerald Schneider, Margit Bussmann, and Constantin Ruhe, “The Dynamics of Mass Killings: Testing Time-Series Models of One-Sided Violence in the Bosnian Civil War” *International Interactions* 2012: 4; Clionadh Raleigh, “Violence Against Civilians: A Disaggregated Analysis” *International Interactions* 2012: 4; Shale Horowitz and Min Ye,
Strategic Approaches

Most authors who research one-sided violence view it as a strategy during wars. In other words, perpetrators engage in murderously abusive behavior because it benefits their interests. These interests can be political, militaristic, economic, etc. This view falls under a realist theoretical framework, which suggests that actions result from a rational calculus.

According to one strategic approach to understanding one-sided violence, a group may calculate to kill innocent civilians as a result of competition and group dynamics. This theory proposes that within a competitive environment, rebels and governments use one-sided violence since civilians are expendable in war and targeting them shows strength, which generates attention and thus recruits. Essentially, one-sided violence is like a bargaining process between armed groups. The theory proposes that rebels are more violent and pose a greater direct threat to civilians than governments, which rely on militia groups to carry out the violence. Rebel groups and government forces have an opposition hierarchy of different violent sub-groups within them; a group’s position in the hierarchy determines its use of one-sided violence, and this hierarchy may be different based on location. Additionally, competition levels and thus severity of one-sided violence may be different in various locations, as a result of the level of

contestation for a given territory. Thus, a competition and group dynamics – based approach to understanding one-sided violence requires a spatial and temporal analysis.\textsuperscript{27}

Horowitz and Ye also approach understanding one-sided violence with a competition-based framework that is grounded in conflict bargaining. However, they do not argue that the motivation for one-sided violence is to generate attention and gain recruits. Instead, motivation stems from the desire to conquer territory, prevent the enemy from engaging in civilian-based low-intensity warfare, and impose more exclusive political control. Furthermore, this theory more specifically looks at relative power advantages and extreme nationalist preferences as indicators of one-sided violence, as opposed to broad group dynamics. According to the relative power framework, the more powerful side in ethno-territorial wars is theoretically more likely to initiate and escalate the intensity of one-sided violence. Additionally, more extreme nationalist leaders are expected to be more likely to initiate and escalate one-sided violence than moderate nationalist leaders. Despite these differences, this approach still views competition and bargaining to be the underlying explanation for why one-sided violence exists during conflict.\textsuperscript{28}

Another strategic-based approach to understanding one-sided violence focuses on group leadership. Unlike Horowitz and Ye’s competition-based study that attributes one-sided violence to level of nationalism in a specific leader, the underlying framework behind this theory is that radical goals, threats to power, and difficult military problems encourage a small group of leaders to initiate mass killing campaigns as a means of

\textsuperscript{27} Raleigh, “Violence Against Civilians: A Disaggregated Analysis.”
\textsuperscript{28} Horowitz and Min Ye, “Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference- Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies.”
dispelling those threats. These leaders rely on strong recruitment methods to form murderous squads and thus do not need a great level of societal support. Since mass killing typically occurs in non-democracies, such broad-based, public support is not necessary. Similar to the competition and group dynamics approach, this theory applies not only to ethnic-based conflicts but communist, territorial, counterguerrilla, terrorist, and imperialist ones too. However, this theory differs from the competition and group dynamics approach in its heavier concentration on governments as the source of more one-sided violence instead of rebels. Overall, though, it still contributes to the theories that one-sided is strategic and a result of rational calculation.  

Some scholars use a strategic approach in their attempt to understand one-sided violence. It suggests state security is the impetus behind killing innocent civilians. This theory argues that a group may increase the intensity of one-sided violence if it perceives a threat to its state security. For example, during World War II, Hitler announced his plans for the Final Solution after it was clear that Germany would not win. Once the Russians launched their successful counter-offensive on December 5, 1941 and the Pearl Harbor brought the U.S. into the war on December 7, Germany’s state security deteriorated. Indeed, Hitler announced his genocidal intentions on December 12, 1941. Thus, the increase in the intensity of one-sided violence is attributable to a perceived threat to state security. However, not all scholars focus on one-sided violence specifically in the state security framework. For instance, Posen broadly addresses ethnic violence as a result of the collapse of imperial regimes, which leaves a problem of

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“emerging anarchy.” This anarchy instills fear about state security in ethnic groups, leading to a competition for power, and eventually, violence.31

Last within the strategic approaches to understanding one-sided violence is a military logic theory. This framework theorizes that perpetrators commit fewer acts of one-sided violence during or immediately following territorial gains made in battle. It further suggests that the level of one-sided violence increases when fighting is intensive. In their case study analysis of the Bosnian War, Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe found that the number of Serbian victims increased with the number of battles, but that this relationship did not exist for Bosniak victims. Furthermore, the study found that direct killings decreased after Serbian military operations. However, an increasing number of territorial conquests by the Bosniaks lowered the risk of one-sided violence in that week for the Serbian victims. Overall, the research supports the claim that developments in battles play a role in one-sided violence. This study does demonstrate, though, that micro-level analysis of specific cases, as opposed to general theories, may be most accurate in assessing one-sided violence.32

Constructivist Approaches

Not all scholars who study one-sided violence view it as a strategy during wars. Instead, some view one-sided violence as an expression of cultural or ideational differences, which are often related to ethnicity. Such theories would not fall under a realist framework but a constructivist one. Constructivism suggests that actions result from socially constructed identities.

According to one ideational approach to understanding one-sided violence, a group may kill innocent civilians as a result of a culture-wide cognitive frame, or “a mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others.” A “crisis” frame includes memories of atrocity-ridden, ethnic-based wars and divides a previously cooperative, heterogeneous social world on the basis of those ethnic tensions. Mass media propaganda and elite manipulation awaken this “crisis” frame by instilling fear and hatred in the general public toward other ethnic groups, which instigates one-sided violence. More specifically, intellectuals amplify the “crisis” frame, radical politicians overthrow moderates, and militias perpetrate war crimes. Overall, this theory suggests that ethnic differences, which become culturally amplified, are at the heart of why one-sided violence occurs during wars.33

Another ideational approach to understanding one-sided violence views it as a result of democratization. This theory suggests that the democratic notion of “rule by the people” becomes associated with the dominant ethnic group in a heterogeneous society, leading to a rise in ethnic hostility. One-sided violence is attributable to these forces of democratization. In addition to the culture-wide aspects of democratization, one-sided violence can be a result of the mindsets and motivations of different types of perpetrators who operate within the democratization context; these perpetrators include ideological killers, who believe in the righteousness of murderous cleansing; violent killers, who are drawn to murder itself; materialist killers, who are lured by the prospect of economic

33 Oberschall, “The manipulation of ethnicity: from ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia.”
gain; and others. Thus, this theoretical approach is not purely constructivist in its analysis of the psychology behind specific types of individuals. This analysis, though, certainly would not fall under the strategic category since it does not view one-sided violence to be benefiting a group’s interests.  

*Intervention Theories*

As the U.S. and other world powers increasingly take on the responsibility to protect victims of one-sided violence, it is necessary to review the existing literature on intervention theories. These theories look at a variety of different types of interventions, including militaristic, diplomatic, and economic ones, amongst others. Furthermore, they differ over whether they analyze intervention’s effect on one-sided violence or wartime developments more broadly.

*Possibility for Success*

First, some research analyzes whether intervention even has the possibility of success at all. One approach, which is the common wisdom, is that intervention reduces violence levels. This understanding drives the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm,

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which was developed following a UN General Assembly meeting in September 2000 during which the Government of Canada announced the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). According to 2001 The Responsibility to Protect Report:

> While the state whose people are directly affected has the default responsibility to protect, a residual responsibility also lies with the broader community of states. This fallback responsibility is activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities… This responsibility also requires that in some circumstances action must be taken by the broader community of states to support populations that are in jeopardy or under serious threat.  

The requirement mentioned in this report assumes that action taken by the broader international community will actually help victims of one-sided violence.

Support for the principles of R2P argues that the proliferation of weak states, rise of subnational and transnational actors, and globalization call for an increasing need to protect people who may become victims of one-sided violence around the world. Furthermore, R2P is consistent with Western values, such as a strong belief in the immorality of one-sided violence, and it is necessary since one-sided violence is costly to the international community. States experiencing such high levels of violence face costs in human capital and foreign investments. MacQueen supports this optimistic view of intervention by asserting that intervention may be part of the natural course of wars; it may help combatants arrive at the negotiation table, which would bring an end to one-

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sided violence. In essence, this approach assumes that intervention will lead to a decrease in one-sided violence levels.

The other approach is that intervention is not effective. This theory assumes that genocidal violence results from the state responding to a rebellion from a lower group. A norm of external powers intervening in another state’s affairs to protect civilians from violence raises the expectation for such intervention, and thus encourages sub-state groups to engage in rebellious behavior that they otherwise might not have, which in turn causes genocide. Luttwak, promoting the theory that MacQueen directly challenged, suggests that wars have a natural course; intervention interrupts this natural course and prevents wars from burning themselves out on their own. Cease-fires, for example, allows combatants to rearm and thus intensify the conflict. In other words, intervention is detrimental in that it actually fosters one-sided violence against civilians.

**How to Make Intervention Effective**

Within the research that looks at how to make intervention effective, scholars look at a variety of types of intervention. One approach focuses specifically on military interventions. Authors studying military interventions tend to assess the various strategies that an intervener can use. For instance, an intervener can rely on deterrence, defense, compellence, or offense. Seybolt argues that the most effective strategy to use depends on the goals of the intervention. If it seeks to deliver emergency aid, avoidance is the best strategy; if it seeks to protect aid operations, deterrence and defense are the best.

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41 Ibid.
strategies; if it seeks to save victims, then deterrence, defense, and compellence are the best strategies; or if it seeks to defeat the perpetrator, then compellence and offense are the best strategies.\textsuperscript{43} Research suggests, though, that challenging the perpetrator and aiding the victims specifically are the most effective ways of reducing the severity of one-sided violence.\textsuperscript{44}

Other approaches look at the different types of intervention that fall within a specific strategy. For instance, a compellence strategy may include air strikes, threats of air strikes, or ongoing diplomatic negotiations. In addition, it is important to assess the situation on the ground when determining which strategy and type of intervention to use. For instance, a changing military balance between the actors engaging in hostilities may have an effect on an intervention’s likelihood of success.\textsuperscript{45} On top of the situation on the ground, international and domestic politics and economic sanctions may play a role in how effective an intervention is likely to be.\textsuperscript{46} Overall, authors who look at military intervention into a conflict generally look at airpower, but this is just one of several types of engagement.

Another theoretical framework in assessing the effectiveness of intervention focuses on peacekeeping and diplomacy. Research on this type of intervention finds that it may not be as effective as military involvement. For example, in their analysis of the Bosnian War, Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe found that although UN resolutions

\textsuperscript{43} Taylor Seybolt, \textit{Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure.}  
\textsuperscript{44} Krain, “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides.”  
\textsuperscript{45} McLaughlin, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection”; Beale, “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”  
\textsuperscript{46} Beale, “Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
calling for increases in peacekeeping troops did reduce one-sided violence by the Serbs, it did not reduce one-sided violence by the Bosniaks. Additionally, an improvement in relations between Russia and the Serbs reduced the number of people killed or harmed by the Serbs, though enhanced relations between the UN and the Serbs led to an increased number of victims of Serb aggression. Russian-Serb agreements did contribute to a decrease in one-sided violence by the Serbs, yet US-Bosniak agreements contributed to an increase in one-sided violence by the Bosniaks. These cases show the limitations in peacekeeping and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{47}

However, it should be noted that other research has suggested different results regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping. For instance, one study finds the presence of peacekeepers does not significantly affect the level of one-sided violence by government, though it does encourage an increase in the level of one-sided violence by rebel groups. This finding applies for both UN and non-UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{48} The different results in this study from the results in the previous study suggest the inconsistency in peacekeeping effectiveness.

A third type of intervention that scholars study is foreign aid. External actors may use economic aid in cases that have a lower rate of one-sided violence, though foreign aid can also consist of military aid and counter-narcotics aid as well.\textsuperscript{49} Surprisingly, increases in military aid tend to raise the number of civilians a government kills and the number of civilians killed by rebels. However, increases in overseas development assistance leads to

\textsuperscript{47} Schneider, Bussmann, and Ruhe, “The Dynamics of Mass Killings: Testing Time-Series Models of One-Sided Violence in the Bosnian Civil War.”

\textsuperscript{48} Hultman, “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians.”

\textsuperscript{49} Fielding and Shortland, “Foreign Interventions and Abuse of Civilians during the Peruvian Civil War.”
a decrease in one-sided violence. Likewise, increases in counter-narcotics aid contributes to a decrease in one-sided violence.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, similar to peacekeeping, the effect that foreign aid has on violence against civilians is inconsistent.

Some research focuses on how an external actor should behave when engaging in intervention to ensure success, as opposed to a specific type of intervention. For instance, impartiality is thought to be essential in an effective intervention, not to mention that it adds legitimacy to intervention. The assumption behind impartiality is that the goal of intervention is simply to reduce one-sided violence, not to ensure a victory for one side of a conflict. However, other research suggests that impartiality can actually be detrimental to the level of one-sided violence during war since it only signals to the perpetrator that the international community is noticing their behavior, which is unlikely to have much of an effect on a group or government whose goal is to eliminate another group. This theory argues that an intervener should challenge the perpetrator specifically in order to reduce violence, as this partiality suggests the intervener’s credibility and resolve.\textsuperscript{51}

**Hypotheses**

The literature suggests several conflicting possibilities for the effect of airstrikes, threats, and UN safe areas on one-sided violence. The following hypotheses regarding the relationship between intervention and one-sided violence reflect these possibilities.

*Intervention Leads to a Decrease in One-Sided Violence*

The common wisdom behind intervention is that it should lead to alleviate a humanitarian catastrophe situation. This understanding drives the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm.

\textsuperscript{50} Fielding and Shortland, “Foreign Interventions and Abuse of Civilians during the Peruvian Civil War.”

\textsuperscript{51} Krain, “International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides.”
From this theory, we can deduce that airstrikes, threats, and the establishment of UN safe areas lead to a decrease in one-sided violence. As the external power weighs down on the perpetrators of aggression, they should yield to this pressure and cease their violent behavior. Following this logic, the following hypotheses arise:

H1A: Airstrikes lead to a decrease in one-sided violence.

H1B: Threats lead to a decrease in one-sided violence.

H1C: The establishment of UN safe areas leads to a decrease in one-sided violence.

*Intervention Leads to an Increase in One-Sided Violence*

Research suggests that a perceived threat to state security leads to an increase in one-sided violence. The international setting and its threat to the perpetrator play a role in this. From this theory, we can deduce that airstrikes, threats, and the establishment of UN safe areas lead to an increase in one-sided violence as well. As the international community became hardened in their response to Serb aggression with these actions, the Bosnian Serbs may have perceived their security to be threatened, contributing to more killing of and assaults on Bosnian Muslims. Resulting from this framework, we gain the following hypotheses:

H2A: Airstrikes lead to an increase in one-sided violence.

H2B: Threats lead to an increase in one-sided violence.

H2C: The establishment of UN safe areas leads to an increase in one-sided violence.

*Null Hypotheses*

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52 Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century.*
There is always the potential that intervention will not lead to an increase or decrease in one-sided violence. The following null hypotheses reflect this possibility:

H3A: Airstrikes have no effect on one-sided violence.

H3B: Threats have no effect on one-sided violence.

H3C: The establishment of UN safe areas has no effect on one-sided violence.

**Methodology**

My study involves a disaggregated analysis of intervention and one-sided violence during the Bosnian War. This disaggregated analysis entails dividing a grand intervention campaign into its specific components, which includes the types of intervention and the actual time of intervention. My data distinguishes between airstrikes, the establishment of UN safe areas, and threats, and between days during which these acts of intervention occurred and days during which these acts of intervention did not occur over the course of the war. The disaggregated analysis further entails dividing grand campaigns of one-sided violence into its specific components, which include the types of one-sided violence and the actual time of one-sided violence. As opposed to considering the general one-sided violence campaigns during the Bosnian War, my data distinguishes between the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence, as well as between the total number of civilians killed and harmed from week to week.

A disaggregated analysis is not commonly used in studies that assess intervention and violence. For example, Seybolt disaggregates intervention into type and disaggregates violence into lives lost and saved; however, he does not disaggregate intervention and violence into daily or weekly events. He excludes this variable because
his concern regards the relationship between types of intervention and the overall lives saved or lost during a war, not the relationship daily types of intervention and weekly numbers of different types of violence.\textsuperscript{53} Valentino does not include a disaggregated analysis at all in his study of mass killing and genocide. Since his concern revolves around the factors that instigate such violence, his data includes cases in which mass killing and genocide merely occurred, as opposed to weekly numbers of civilians killed and harmed.\textsuperscript{54} These macro-level methodologies may benefit the authors because their studies involve a comparative analysis of different case studies.

A disaggregated approach is far more beneficial for an analysis of a single case study. Essentially, my research involves an assessment of the intervention and violence characteristics that are specific to the Bosnian War. For such micro-level research, a particular look at daily airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, and threats, as well as at weekly numbers of civilians killed and harmed provides insight into those specific characteristics. Although a comparative analysis of the relationship between daily acts of intervention and weekly acts of one-sided violence may be more challenging, Seybolt and Valentino exclude data that is essential to an accurate assessment of intervention and violence. For instance, Seybolt cannot assess the temporal relationship between intervention and violence as the campaigns for each continue on, only once they are both complete. Similarly, Valentino cannot assess the dynamics of violence levels throughout a war’s duration, only the initiation of such violence. Thus, disaggregated data offers a more robust analysis.

\textsuperscript{53} Taylor Seybolt, \textit{Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure}.
\textsuperscript{54} Valentino, \textit{Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century}. 
I draw my data on the number of civilians killed and harmed from the Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset (KOSVED). KOSVED reports on one-sided violence during a variety of different conflicts; it defines one-sided violence as “violent acts perpetrated by an organized group, which can be either a rebel organization or government troops, directed against a group of unarmed non-combatants during, shortly before, or after a conflict.”\textsuperscript{55} It specifically reports on the daily numbers of civilians killed and harmed as a result of one-sided violence, and disaggregates these totals into the number killed and harmed by certain types of tactics. For civilians killed, these means include shooting, bombings, suicide attacks, tank attacks, aircraft attacks, weapons of mass destruction, or unknown means. For civilians harmed, these means include sexual violence, primitive weapons, shooting, bombings, suicide attacks, tank attacks, aircraft attacks, weapons of mass destruction, or unknown means. It further disaggregates the number of civilians killed and harmed into separate victim characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, and age, though my study is not concerned with this data.\textsuperscript{56}

The authors of KOSVED collect their data from a variety of press reports as their primary source of information since they are available at short notice and are what actors involved in the conflict view. They insist that survey-based data collection has shortfalls since controversies often exist over the exact number of civilians killed and harmed.\textsuperscript{57} KOSVED does tend to use more conservative data when calculating the number of

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
civilians killed and harmed; for instance, it reports that only 4,500 people died in the Srebrenica massacre, whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia places the number at approximately 7,000.58

I draw my data on the type and timing of intervention from “Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower?,” a thesis by Kurt F. Miller, MAJ, U.S. Army. Maj. Miller created a master list of daily military, political, and diplomatic actions taken by outside powers during the Bosnian War. Specifically, he includes intervening acts taken by the UN, NATO, US, and European Commission. He further includes significant events on the ground, such as major events of mass killing and turning points in hostilities amongst legitimate combatants.59 My research is specifically concerned with airstrikes, threats, and UN safe area establishments.

Acts of intervention other than airstrikes, threats, and UN safe area establishments occurred during the Bosnian War as well. For instance, external powers played significant diplomatic roles in trying to foster negotiations amongst the warring parties. However, I choose to focus on airstrikes, threats, and UN safe area establishments because information was the most readily available for them. Since the earliest day of these interventions occurred on April 16, 1993, which featured the establishment of a UN safe area, I only look at violence data beginning in April 1993 (the KOSVED data begins in March 1992). Furthermore, since the final day of intervention occurred on September 12, 1995, which featured airstrikes, I continue to look at violence data only until September 1995 (the KOSVED data ends in October 1995).

I do not disaggregate the data on intervention and one-sided violence geographically. Some might argue that in order to accurately assess the effect intervention has on one-sided violence, one should only look at intervention and one-sided violence that occurred within the same location. However, my data includes intervention acts and one-sided violence acts across all of Bosnia. This lack of geography-related assessment is undeniably a shortfall in my research; however, there were so few days of intervention to begin with that limiting my data to only those that saw one-sided violence in the same location preceding and following them would provide me with too small a dataset to conduct a study.

Nonetheless, there are methodologically sound reasons to take a broader geographical approach. Midlarsky argues that violence against civilians results from a perceived threat to state security, not a perceived threat to the security of a certain geographic radius in which violence occurs. In other words, as long as the Bosnian Serbs, for example, perceive a threat their security as a state in the general Bosnian region due to airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, or threats, then their violent reactions may occur anywhere.\(^6\) Essentially, geography is not necessarily relevant in this realist perspective on security and violence.

I rely on the data from KOSVED and “Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower?” to test my hypotheses regarding the effect of intervention on one-sided violence levels. My research assesses the hypotheses by looking at the relationship between daily intervention (disaggregated into type: airstrike, threat, or UN safe area establishment) and weekly numbers of one-sided violence (disaggregated into

\(^{60}\) Manus Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. 
type: civilians killed or civilians harmed). In other words, I look at six different relationships (that between airstrikes and the number of civilians killed, airstrikes and the number of civilians harmed, UN safe area establishments and the number of civilians killed, UN safe area establishments and the number of civilians harmed, threats and the number of civilians killed, and threats and the number of civilians harmed).

In order to specifically assess the weekly numbers of one-sided violence prior to and following an intervention, I aggregate the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence on each day for the seven days prior to a day of intervention and for the seven days following a day of intervention. I then determine whether there was an increase, decrease, or no change between A: the total number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed in the seven days prior to a day of intervention and B: the total number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed in the seven days following a day of intervention.

I choose a seven-day time series because of its use in other research studies similar to this one. The benefit of seven days is that it is long enough to reflect one-sided violence levels that may have realistically been in response to the intervention, as perpetrators may require several days to plan and alter their plans. However, it is short enough to reflect one-sided violence levels that may only be attributed to the day of intervention, as opposed to another variable that can influence the number of civilians killed and harmed. Since the data in “Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower?” does not include the time at which intervention occurred on a specific day and the data in KOSVED does not include the time at which perpetrators killed and

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harmed civilians, I do not include the number of civilians killed or harmed on the day of intervention while aggregating the total numbers for neither the seven days prior nor the seven days following the day of intervention. Therefore, assuming that any deaths or injuries directly resulting from an intervention, such as an airstrike, occurred on the day of that intervention, my data does not include such numbers.

After I compare the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence between the seven days prior to a day of intervention and the seven days following a day of intervention, I calculate the percent change to determine how significant was the increase or decrease between the two seven day periods. In cases when the number of civilians killed or the number of civilians harmed in the week prior to a day of intervention was zero, I calculate percent change with a value of one instead. If the number of civilians killed or the number of civilians harmed in the week prior to a day of intervention and the week following a day of intervention were both zero, then I determine percent change to simply be 0%. I do this analysis separately for airstrikes, threats, and UN safe area establishments, as well as for the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed. Based on this assessment, I determine which of my hypotheses were correct and the extent to which they were correct.

I subsequently conduct two chi-square independence tests to determine if intervention and one-sided violence act independently. Although a percent change analysis may demonstrate a higher likelihood of increase, decrease, or no change in the level of one-sided violence between the seven days preceding an intervention and the seven days following an intervention, causality cannot be established without this further
statistical evaluation. I do not conduct this test for the six relationships mentioned (airstrikes and civilians killed, airstrikes and civilians harmed, UN safe area establishments and civilians killed, UN safe area establishments and civilians harmed, threats and civilians killed, and threats and civilians harmed). Instead, I divide the time span during which intervention occurred (April 1993 to October 1995) into weekly periods, and assess the difference between weeks during which intervention occurred and weeks during which intervention did not occur. In other words, I add the total number of weeks in which airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, and threats occurred, and I label them all broadly as intervention. A disaggregated approach based on intervention type is not sufficient for the chi-square independence test because of the incredibly low number of days of intervention that actually occurred.

I assess the difference between weeks featuring intervention and weeks without intervention in terms of whether there was no change, an increase, or a decrease in one-sided violence in the week preceding the week of intervention to the week following the week of intervention. An inherent flaw in this analysis is that a day of intervention may have occurred at any point within the seven days of a week; the few days that may have preceded or followed it within that same week are not considered when determining the amount of one-sided violence that came before and after the day of intervention. I conduct two separate chi-square independence tests: one that looked at the difference between weeks of intervention and no intervention in terms of no change, increases, and decreases in the number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence, and one that looked at the difference in terms of number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence.
**Results**

*Percent Change Analysis*

The results of the percent change analysis reflect an inconsistency in the relationship between individual days of intervention, disaggregated by type, and weekly numbers of civilians killed and civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence. Essentially, none of the hypotheses hold true for all of the six relationships studied (that between airstrikes and civilians killed, airstrikes and civilians harmed, threats and civilians killed, threats and civilians harmed, UN safe area establishments and civilians killed, and UN safe area establishments and civilians harmed). The relationships between airstrikes and civilians killed, airstrikes and civilians harmed, and UN safe area establishments and civilians killed supports Hypothesis 1 (Intervention leads to a decrease in one-sided violence). The relationship between threats and civilians harmed supports Hypothesis 2 (Intervention leads to an increase in one-sided violence). Lastly, the relationship between UN safe area establishments and civilians harmed, as well as between threats and civilians killed, supports Hypothesis 3 (Intervention has no effect on one-sided violence).

**H1: Intervention Leads to a Decrease in One-Sided Violence**

Hypothesis 1, which suggests that intervention leads to a decrease in one-sided violence, reflects the common wisdom about intervention. However, when using a disaggregated analysis of intervention and one-sided violence during the Bosnian War, it only proves correct for three of the relationships assessed: that between airstrikes and civilians killed, airstrikes and civilians harmed, and UN safe area establishments and civilians killed. Still, it did prove correct more often than Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3.
In total, NATO conducted airstrikes on eighteen days that I included in my data. The assessment of both the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence supports Hypothesis 1. The results of the percent change analysis of the eighteen airstrike days are shown in Chart 1.

Ten of these days saw a higher number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence in the week preceding them than the week following them, five of these days saw a lower number of civilians killed in the week preceding them than the week following them, and three days saw the same number of civilians killed in the week preceding them and the week following them. These results show that roughly 55.6% of airstrike days are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians killed, roughly 27.8% of airstrike days are associated with an increase in the number of civilians killed, and roughly 16.7% of airstrike days are associated with no change in the number of civilians killed. The percent decreases in the number of civilians killed between the seven days prior to an airstrike day and the seven days following an airstrike day ranged from -100% (for November 21, 1995; September 7, 1995; and September 8, 1995) to -34% (for July 11, 1995). The percent increases ranged from +420% (for September 6, 1995) to +34,615% (for July 11, 1995). There were also three days of 0% change (for May 24, 1994; May 25, 1994; and August 5, 1994). Overall, an analysis of the relationship between airstrikes and civilians killed supports Hypothesis 1\textsubscript{A}: Airstrikes lead to a decrease in one-sided violence.

Regarding the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence, eleven of the eighteen days during which NATO conducted airstrikes saw a higher number of civilians killed in the week preceding them than the week following them, five
of these days saw a lower number of civilians killed in the week preceding them than the week following them, and two days saw the same number of civilians killed in the week preceding them and the week following them. These results show that approximately 61.1% of airstrike days are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians killed, approximately 27.8% of airstrike days are associated with an increase in the number of civilians killed, and approximately 11.1% of airstrike days are associated with no change in the number of civilians killed. The percent decreases in the number of civilians harmed between the seven days prior to an airstrike day and the seven days following an airstrike day ranged from -100% (for May 24, 1995 and May 25, 1995) to -34% (for July 11, 1995). The percent increases ranged from +180% (for September 7, 1995) to +1,900% (for November 23, 1994). There were also two days that saw 0% change (August 5, 1995 and November 21, 1994). Overall, an analysis of the relationship between airstrikes and civilians harmed supports Hypothesis 1: Airstrikes lead to a decrease in one-sided violence.

In total, the UN established safe areas on only two days: April 16, 1993 and May 5, 1993. The assessment of only the number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence supports Hypothesis 1. The results of the percent change analysis of the two UN safe area establishment days are shown in Chart 2.

Both days saw a higher number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence in the week preceding them than the week following them. This result shows that 100% of UN safe area establishment days are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians killed. The percent decreases were -78% (for April 16, 1993) and -91% (for May 6, 1993). Overall, an analysis of the relationship between UN safe area establishment and
civilians killed partially support Hypothesis 1c: The establishment of UN safe areas leads to a decrease in one-sided violence. Hypothesis 1c is not fully correct because the relationship between UN safe area establishment and civilians harmed does not support it.

H2: Intervention Leads to an Increase in One-Sided Violence

Hypothesis 2, which suggests that intervention leads to an increase in one-sided violence, reflects the counter-argument to the common wisdom about intervention. While using a disaggregated analysis of intervention and one-sided violence during the Bosnian War, it only proves correct for one of the six relationships assessed: that between threats and civilians harmed. It proved the least correct of the three general hypotheses.

In total, foreign powers only made three threats during the Bosnian War that I included in my data. The assessment of only the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence supports Hypothesis 2. The results of the percent change analysis of the three days of threats are shown in Chart 3.

Two days saw a lower number of civilians harmed in the week preceding them than the week following them. This result shows that roughly 67% of threats are associated with an increase in the number of civilians harmed and roughly 33% of threats are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians harmed. The percent increases in the number of civilians harmed between the seven days prior to a threat day and the seven days following a threat day were +325% (for May 24, 1995) and +56% (for September 3, 1995). The percent decrease was -100% (for April 22, 1994). Overall, an analysis of the relationship between threats and civilians harmed partially supports Hypothesis 2b: Threats lead to an increase in one-sided violence. Hypothesis 2b is not fully correct.
because the relationship between threats and the number of civilians killed does not support it.

**H3: Intervention Has No Effect of One-Sided Violence**

Hypothesis 3, which suggests that intervention has no consistent effect on one-sided violence, represents the null hypothesis. While using a disaggregated analysis of intervention and one-sided violence during the Bosnian War, it proves correct for two of the six relationships assessed: that between UN safe area establishments and the number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence and that between threats and the number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence.

As previously stated, the UN established safe areas during the Bosnian War on only two days that I included in my data. The assessment of the number of civilians harmed supports Hypothesis 3. The results of the percent change analysis of the two days of UN safe area establishments are shown in Chart 2.

One of the two days saw a higher number of civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence in the week preceding it than the week following it (May 6, 1993), and the other saw a lower number of civilians harmed in the week preceding it than the week following it (April 16, 1993). This result shows that 50% of UN safe area establishment days are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians harmed, and 50% are associated with an increase. Overall, an analysis of the relationship between UN safe area establishment and civilians harmed partially supports Hypothesis $3_c$: The establishment of UN safe areas has no effect on one-sided violence. Hypothesis $3_c$ is not fully correct because the relationship between UN safe area establishment and civilians killed does not support it.
As previously stated, foreign powers only made three threats during the Bosnian War that I included in my data. The assessment of the number of civilians killed supports Hypothesis 3. The results of the percent change analysis of the three days of threats are shown in Chart 3.

One of the three days saw a higher number of civilians killed as a result of one-sided violence in the week preceding it than the week following it (April 22, 1994), one saw a lower number of civilians killed in the week preceding it than the week following it (September 3, 1995), and one saw zero civilians killed in the week preceding it and zero civilians killed in the week following it (May 24, 1995). Thus, about 33% of threats are associated with a decrease in the number of civilians killed, about 33% of threats are associated with an increase in the number of civilians killed, and about 33% of threats are associated with no change in the number of civilians killed. The percent decrease between the seven days preceding and seven days following April 22, 1994 was -100% and the percent increase between the seven days preceding and the seven days following September 3, 1995 was +26%. Overall, an analysis of the relationship between threats and civilians killed partially supports Hypothesis 3_B: Threats have no effect on one-sided violence. Hypothesis 3_B is not fully correct because the relationship between threats and the number of civilians harmed does not support it.

The above results demonstrate an inconsistency in the relationship between individual days of intervention, disaggregated by type, and weekly numbers of civilians killed and civilians harmed as a result of one-sided violence. Hypothesis 1, which suggests that intervention leads to a decrease in one-sided violence, reflects the common wisdom about intervention. It proved correct most often (for the relationship between
airstrikes and number of civilians killed, airstrikes and number of civilians harmed, and
UN safe area establishments and number of civilians killed). Still, Hypothesis 1 only
proved correct for three of the six relationships assessed. Hypothesis 3, which suggests
that intervention has no effect on one-sided violence, was found to be correct for two of
the relationships (that between UN safe area establishments and the number of civilians
harmed and that between threats and the number of civilians killed). Hypothesis 2, which
suggests that intervention leads to an increase in one-sided violence, reflects the counter-
argument to the general wisdom about intervention. It proved correct least often (only for
the relationship between threats and number of civilians harmed). Due to the results of
this study, it is difficult to make a substantiated claim regarding the effect of intervention
on one-sided violence.

Chi-Square Independence Test

After conducting a percent change analysis on the relationships between the three types
of intervention and the two types of one-sided violence, I conduct two chi-square
independence tests.

The findings of the two chi-square independence tests are shown in Charts 4 and
5. As a result of these findings, I obtain a chi-squared statistics with two degrees of
freedom of .14 and p-value of .92 for the number of civilians killed by one-sided
violence, and a chi-squared statistics of 2.4 and p-value of .3 for the number of civilians
harmed by one-sided violence. Since the p-value in the social sciences is .05, there is not
enough evidence to suggest that intervention and the number of civilians killed, or
intervention and the number of civilians harmed, are dependent. In other words, there is
not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
Thus, despite the results discussed above and findings shown in Charts 1, 2, and 3, I cannot confidently assert causality. Essentially, one cannot confidently state that airstrikes do lead to a decrease in the number of civilians killed or the number of civilians harmed, and one cannot confidently state that UN safe area establishments lead to a decrease in the number of civilians killed, despite the statistics to reflect this relationship. Likewise, one cannot confidently state that threats lead to an increase in the number of civilians harmed, despite the statistics to reflect this relationship. These results must be rejected due to the chi-square independence test. This test does not suggest that the null hypothesis is definitely correct, it merely reflects that there is not enough evidence to say that it is not correct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Deaths 1 Week Prior</th>
<th>Total Deaths 1 Week Following</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>Total Harmed 1 Week Prior</th>
<th>Total Harmed 1 Week Following</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>April 10, 1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>+ 1,340%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>+ 810%</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 11, 1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>+ 1,340%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>+ 810%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 25, 1994</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>May 25, 1995</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>May 26, 1995</td>
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<td>207</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Total Deaths 1 Week Prior</td>
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<td>Percent Change</td>
<td>Total Harmed 1 Week Prior</td>
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<td>Percent Change</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<td>4/22/94</td>
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<td>-100%</td>
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<td>5/24/95</td>
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<td>9/3/95</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<th>Total Deaths 1 Week Following</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>Total Harmed 1 Week Prior</th>
<th>Total Harmed 1 Week Following</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
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<td>-91%</td>
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### Chart 4: Chi-Square Independence Test Contingency Table - Harmed

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<th>Observed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>1</td>
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<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Increase</td>
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<td>Intervention</td>
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<td>No Intervention</td>
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### Chart 5: Chi-Square Independence Test Contingency Table - Deaths

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<tbody>
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<td>No Change</td>
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<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
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<td>Intervention</td>
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</table>
Final Discussion

Although the results were inconclusive, they are actually incredibly important considering the common belief that intervention leads to a decrease in one-sided violence and the counter-arguments that intervention leads to an increase in one-sided violence. The percent change analysis did demonstrate that airstrikes lead to a decrease in both the number of civilians killed and the number of civilians harmed. This finding is most relevant, as air power is often the type of military action that interveners employ. However, the chi-square independence test suggested that there is not enough evidence to confidently assert causality. The overarching problem with this study, and specifically the case of the Bosnian War, is that there are such few days of intervention to actually assess. Eighteen days of airstrikes, two days of UN safe area establishments, and three days of threats occurred. It is not easy to find a reliable trend in the relationship between intervention and one-sided violence with such little data to use. This is problematic both logically and statistically, as a small amount of data makes a chi-square independence test less reliable.

There are many ways to expand on this current study. First, one could expand the dataset by including other forms of intervention in addition to airstrikes, UN safe area establishments, and threats. Other types of intervention include diplomatic engagements, such as the Vance-Owen Plan. Second, a researcher may want to look at a geographical analysis that takes into consideration distance between locations of intervention and locations of one-sided violence. Further, other variables influencing one-sided violence should be taken into consideration. For instance, one might ask: Do hostilities on the ground influence the levels of one-sided violence? How so?
In assessing the violence variable, a researcher may want to expand or contract the seven day time series that I used in my model to see how such changes alter the results. Additionally, one could expand on the definition of one-sided violence. As opposed to only considering the number of civilians killed and harmed, it may be useful to look at other types of violence, such as expulsions and destruction to religious buildings.

Overall, the lack of concrete results does suggest a fault in relying on large-N, quantitative studies that political scientists are moving toward. The results in this research suggest that more micro-level case studies, which assess the specific situation of each instance of intervention and one-sided violence, may be more effective. In other words, perhaps it is not possible to show a trend amongst individual acts of killing, harming, torturing, or expelling civilians. Perhaps each incident possesses its own unique impetus based on the time, location, and situation, whether that’s political, militaristic, economic, psychological, etc. If that proves to be the case, then a legitimate assessment of intervention must look at each individual incident and determine its specific causal patterns. The problem with large-N quantitative studies is that they often require numerous case studies to gather enough data to test their hypotheses. Because they do not focus on one specific case, they miss the specific details unique to each individual one. In conclusion, qualitative, micro-level analyses may be most beneficial when analyzing intervention’s effect on one-sided violence during wars.
References


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